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A B S T R A C T
Human eggs for basic, fertility and stem-cell research are in short supply. Many experiments that require their use cannot be carried out at present,
and, therefore, the beneﬁts that could emerge from these are either delayed or never materialise. This state of affairs is problematic for scientists and
patients worldwide, and it is a matter that needs our attention. Recent advances in chimera research have opened the possibility of creating human/
non-human animal chimeras intended for human gamete production (chimeras-IHGP). In this paper, I examine four arguments against the creation of
such chimeras and prove that all of them are found wanting. I conclude by showing that there is a strong moral reason for scientists to pursue this
research avenue.
© 2017 Reproductive Healthcare Ltd. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Different strategies have been proposed for increasing the supply of
human eggs for research purposes: compensating women for egg do-
nation, obtaining human eggs from aborted fetuses, posthumous egg
donation, and in-vitro gametogenesis. Serious research efforts are dedi-
cated to in-vitro gametogenesis at the moment (Hendriks et al., 2015).
Each of these options, however, is faced with different ethical dilem-
mas and regulatory constraints (Baylis, 2009; Ellison andMeliker, 2011;
Greely, 2016).
One possible avenue for solving the egg shortage problem is to
createhuman/non-humananimal chimeras intended forhumangamete
production (chimeras-IHGP). One way in which this can be achieved
is through interspecies blastocyst complementation. In this tech-
nique, a non-human animal blastocyst is obtained fromamutant strain
in which ‘a gene critical for the development of a particular lineage
is disabled’ (Wuet al., 2016, 2017). Afterwards, this blastocyst is comple-
mentedwith human stem cells, whichwill compensate for the existing
niche.
Despite ongoing research and scientiﬁc and ethical discussions about
the development of chimeras capable of producing solid organs, such
as kidneys and hearts for transplantation purposes, no wide discussion
of the possibility of creating chimeras-IHGP has taken place. Scientists
have only discussed how to avoid creating chimeras capable of pro-
ducing human gametes (Rashid et al., 2014). A possible explanation for
this is that many scientists consider that developing such chimeras is
so ‘ethically and politically problematic’, that it is not even worth dis-
cussing this option. For example, Rashid et al. (2014), while discussing
interspecies complementation for organ generation, have stated that:
[We are] sensitive to the fact that research with the potential to
present the following hypothetical scenarios warrants particu-
larly thorough consideration prior to commencement. (. . .)
(2) Situations wherein functional human gametes (eggs or sperm)
might develop from precursor cell types in an animal, and where
fertilization between either human (or human-derived) gametes
and animal gametes might then occur. (Rashid et al., 2014, p. 408)
In order to avoid the above, scientists are developing methods of
target-organ generation that would preclude the accidental genera-
tion of human gametes within human/non-human animal chimeras
(Kobayashi et al., 2015; Rashid et al., 2014). Owing to space con-
straints in this paper, I only discuss creating chimeras-IHGP for obtaining
human gametes for research purposes. The ethical issues concern-
ing use of chimera-generated human gametes for reproductive purposes,
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just as with in-vitro generated gametes for reproductive purposes, are
important and need further exploration. For an up-to-date review of the
scientiﬁc state of in-vitro gametogenesis, see Hendriks et al. (2015); for
an up-to-date review of the ethics debate on in-vitro gametogenesis,
see Smajdor and Cutas (2015) and Segers et al. (2017).
At this point, we must ask: why might developing chimeras-
IHGP be so morally problematic that it should not be attempted? Four
arguments against the creation of chimeras IHGP seem promising:
human dignity would be violated by their creation; the value of human
gametes would be debased by being generated within chimeras; gen-
erating such creatures is problematic because a human, or hybrid,
pregnancy could ensue; and the research beneﬁts of using such
gametes do not outweigh the harms (death or pain) that the chimera
would suffer. In what follows, I assess these arguments and show
that they are found wanting, and then present an argument in favour
of creating such type of chimera.
Human dignity
Appeals to human dignity when objecting to new biomedical research
are common. It, therefore, seems natural that somemay claim that the
creation of chimeras-IHGPwould constitute a violation of human dignity,
and consequently that such creatures should not be created. The problem
with this position is that it is not at all clear how human dignity could
be violated by the mere creation of such creatures, as the claim that
the creation of any human/non-human animal chimera (of which
chimeras-IHGP are a subset) inherently violates human dignity is just
false. We do not consider that the existence of a NOG mouse with en-
grafted human cells violates human dignity, even when it is a human/
mouse chimera. Neither, do we consider that human dignity is violated
when someone receives a pig heart valve, which effectively turns them
into a chimera.
A more charitable reading of this kind of argument would rest upon
the claim that creating a chimera-IHGP would create a being with
human dignity. Therefore, it may be claimed that given this, and the
belief that creatures in possession of a dignity ought not be used
merely as a means to an end, chimeras IHGP should not be created.
If this is what it is meant, then what would actually follow is that how
we treat such creatures determines whether their dignity is vio-
lated, or not (Palacios-González, 2015a). From this position, it would
also follow that we have the same moral obligations towards such
chimeras as we have towards other human persons. If human dignity
is tied to the possession of certain higher mental capacities, then as
long as the chimeras-IHGP lack them, there would be no danger of
violating their human dignity, as they would not possess it in the ﬁrst
place. Precluding the generation of human brain cells through genetic
engineering, a strategy examined by Rashid et al. (2014), when cre-
ating chimeras-IHGP would highly reduce the possibility of accidentally
creating a chimera with human brain cells. Therefore, as long as the
chimeras-IHGP that we create do not possess higher mental capaci-
ties, it is simply not true that creatures with human dignity would be
created, and even less that human dignity would be violated.
The value of human gametes
It may also be argued that chimeras-IHGP ought not be created
because to do so would debase the value of human gametes. In order
to answer this question, we ﬁrst need to specify the kind of value
that human gametes possess. Human gametes could possess two
different types of value: inherent value or instrumental value. This
means that they could be valuable in themselves or that they could
be valuable as a means to achieve others’ ends (Palacios-González,
2015b).
To defend the proposition that human gametes have intrinsic value
is to assert that they have interests, that we have obligations towards
them, and that the obligations we have towards them are based, at
least partly, on their interests (DeGrazia, 2008). This position is im-
plausible. What interests could a gamete have? To create an embryo?
And if this were so, are we morally required to help gametes create
embryos so they can fulﬁl their interests?
If it is held that human gametes do not have intrinsic value, they
may still possess instrumental value. This means that they can have
value as tools that we could use to achieve other ends. For example,
most people resorting to IVF value their gametes not for them-
selves but as means to create a child. If it is true that human gametes
only possess instrumental value then we have to ask if the value of
chimera generated human gametes should be considered inferior to
that of human-generated human gametes. The answer to this ques-
tion, however, does not seem likely to be positive. Given that
instrumental value is task-dependent, we have to assert that the in-
strumental value of chimera-generated human gametes should be
assessed by examining how they perform as tools for achieving a
certain goal. It is in relation to their capacity to achieve certain ends
that we should judge them as valuable or not. For example, the in-
strumental value of chimera-generated human gametes for human
embryonic stem-cell research should be assessed by establishing if
they achieve the purpose intended by the researchers.
Given that (a) human gametes do not possess intrinsic value (that
could be debased) and that (b) they can only possess instrumental
value (which is task-dependent), we must conclude that the debase-
ment of value argument is found wanting and thus fails to provide
moral reasons for not creating chimeras-IHGP.
Chimera human pregnancy
A third argument against the creation of chimeras-IHGP is that gen-
erating them is morally problematic because a human, or hybrid,
pregnancy could ensue. Even if we accept, for the sake of argu-
ment, that we should not attempt, or allow, for chimeras to become
pregnant with a human conceptus, it does not follow from this that
we should not create chimeras-IHGP. This argument depends on the
likelihood of a human or hybrid pregnancy ensuing, and this is a prac-
tical issue that can be easily dealt with. Henry T. Greely (2013) has
proposed ﬁve courses of action to avoid these scenarios: creating chi-
meras of only one sex; using chimeras that are reproductively
immature and euthanizing them before they reach reproductive ma-
turity; sterilizing them; euthanizing them if they become pregnant;
physically segregating them by sex.
If our intention is to create chimeras-IHGP for their human eggs,
then the ﬁrst course of action seems the most appropriate in order
to avoid ‘human pregnancies’: we should only create female chime-
ras. This would be themost sensible thing to do given that there is no
shortage of human sperm for research purposes. In a scenario inwhich
it is desirable to create chimeras capable of producing both female
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and male human gametes, we could just take the appropriate mea-
sures for them to be segregated by sex. As long as we are reliably
capable of avoiding human or hybrid pregnancies the strength of this
argument is insufﬁcient for ruling out the creation of chimeras-IHGP.
Animal welfare
A ﬁnal argument against the creation, and use, of chimeras-IHGP is
that the harms that they would be subject to would not be out-
weighed by the beneﬁts that they would produce; and given that non-
existence is not a harm, then we should not create them. In order to
address this argument, we must ﬁrst emphasise that the chimeras
that we are considering here possess animal-proper mental capaci-
ties: meaning that they would possess the mental capacities of the
non-human component. For example, a mouse-human chimera
capable of producing human eggs would possess mental capacities
that are species-typical for mice. This is important if we consider that
the moral value of human persons, and thus the protections against
unwanted harmful interventions, is related to their possession of higher
cognitive capacities (Palacios-González, 2016).
It is true that certain research aims morally justify causing pain, or
terminating, certain non-person sentient animals (e.g. mice). It is also
true that other research aims fall short of justifying such harms (e.g.
developing a new cosmetic eyelash). Also, it is uncontroversial that saving
people’s lives, or ameliorating people’s great suffering, are aims that
justify harming or killing certain sentient animals, when there are not
other means available to us. Therefore, if the research aims for using
chimeras-IHGP are geared towards saving people’s lives, or amelio-
rating people’s great suffering, then creating themand later on extracting
their human eggs is morally justiﬁable. On the other hand, the moral
permissibility of using chimeras-IHGP in research that is not geared
towards saving people’s lives, or ameliorating people’s great suffering,
will depend, partially, on the fact if the harms imposed are propor-
tional to the expected net beneﬁts (DeGrazia and Sebo, 2015). Discussing,
speciﬁcally, if it is morally permissible to create human/non-human
primate chimeras for generating human gametes would require much
more space than available; see Shaw et al. (2014), Palacios-González
(2016), and Dondorp et al. (2016) for a recent debate on the creation and
use of human/non-human primate chimeras.
Two important caveats must bementioned. First, we should extract
the chimera’s eggs in the least harmful way possible. Second, if other
morally permissible methods were available for obtaining human eggs
(e.g. in-vitro gametogenesis) that would not require creating and ex-
perimenting on sentient creatures, then we should choose those other
means. Given the urgency of the human egg shortage problem, at this
point in time we should simultaneously explore the chimera route and
the in-vitro one, and only give up the former route if the latter one, or
another one, is capable of adequately dealing with the human egg short-
age problem.
We can conﬁdently assert that the animal welfare argument is not
successful in presenting a principled argument against creating, and
using chimeras-IHGP if other forms of research which involve causing
harm to non-human animals for the purpose of saving the lives of
or ameliorating the suffering of people are considered permissible.
Indeed, given that research aimed at saving people’s lives or ame-
liorating the great suffering of people is generally deemed not only
permissible but morally urgent, we can assert that there may in fact
be strongmoral reasons to pursue research into chimeras-IHGP. Even
when it is true that the force of this positive argument depends on
the utility of chimera-produced human gametes, and thus it is open
to empirical veriﬁcation, we cannot rule out in principle this re-
search avenue.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have questioned in this paper the morality of a chimera
solution to the human egg shortage problem. I examined four pos-
sible arguments against this option and showed that all of them are
found wanting. The ﬁrst concerned the claim that human dignity would
be violated by the creation of chimeras-IHGP. This argument fails
because what would follow, if true, is that a creature with dignity would
be created. I also pointed out that given that most chimeras-IHGP
would not possess higher mental capacities then they would not
possess human dignity in the ﬁrst place. The second suggested that
the value of human gametes would be debased and that we should
therefore not proceed down this path. This argument also fails because
human gametes, either generated by humans or chimeras, do not
possess intrinsic worth capable of being debased. Human gametes
only possess instrumental value and this value is task-dependent.
Third, arguments suggesting that the possibility of a human or hybrid
pregnancy in fact requires from us not to create such chimeras were
considered. These were also determined to fail because we can easily
and effectively prevent such pregnancies from happening by, for
example, only creating female chimeras. Lastly, the claim that the
aims of such experiments do not morally justify creating and using
such chimeras was explored. It was found, however, that this argu-
ment cannot successfully ground a principled case against creating
and using chimeras-IHGP, because there are certain aims that morally
justify harming sentient animals, for example saving a person’s life.
Finally, it was noted that there is a strong moral reason to create
and use chimeras-IHGP: forwarding research capable of saving peo-
ple’s lives and ameliorating people’s great suffering. Scientists should
accept that there is nothing particularly morally problematic with
creating chimeras-IHGP and should start actively looking into this
direction. For a previous in depth exploration of the philosophical topics
concerning the creation of chimeras-IHGP seePalacios-González (2015b).
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